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Do Workers Benefit from Foreign Ownership? 







The paper examines whether foreign-owned firms pay higher wages than domestically 
owned firms, controlling for a number of firm characteristics. As in most other similar 
studies I find that this appears to be the case. In particular, skilled labor seems to profit 
from working in foreign-owned firms. Furthermore, I distinguish between Swedish 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) and other domestically owned firms. In accordance 
with the idea that MNEs are superior to other firms the former pays significantly higher 
wages than other domestically owned firms. Foreigners acquiring high-wage Swedish 
MNEs may thus account for the higher wages in foreign-owned firms. Alternatively, the 
acquired firms might have more favorable wage growth than non-targeted domestically 
owned firms. Nevertheless, the two explanations are not mutually exclusive I only get 
support for that foreign firms select high-wage firms (Swedish MNEs as well as non-
MNEs) for acquisition. 
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1. Introduction 
 
From the theory on multinational enterprises (MNEs)
1 one might expect 
that multinationals pay higher wages than the predominant wage level. The 
reason is that firms that become MNEs possess firm-specific assets − 
unique products and production processes or intangibles, such as 
trademarks or reputations for quality − that induce productivity and 
profitability gaps between MNEs and other firms. This idea builds upon the 
conjecture that doing business abroad entails higher costs and risks than 
operating on the domestic market; only the most productive and innovative 
firms will find it profitable to engage in foreign production.
2 Also, the firm-
specific assets involve that MNEs have an opportunity to pay non-
competitive wages, i.e. in MNEs there exist some rents to be shared. The 
efficiency wage literature offers then some economic reasons why such 
behavior could be profitable and increase productivity: (i) minimization of 
turnover costs
3 (ii) motivation on workers’ efforts, (iii) enhancement of 
workers’ loyalty, and (iv) selection of workers with high quality.
4 
Multinational enterprises − Swedish-owned MNEs and foreign-owned 
firms − are dominating employers in Swedish manufacturing. More than 70 
percent of the employees in manufacturing firms are employed in MNEs.
5 
This is one important motive for investigating whether MNEs pay higher 
wages than non-MNEs for similar type workers in Swedish manufacturing. 
Moreover, in contrast to most other studies on foreign ownership and 
wages I am able to distinguish between wages paid by Swedish MNEs and 
foreign-owned firms. To preview my results I find, using a panel of 
manufacturing firms during the 1990s, that wages are almost 7 percent 
higher in foreign MNEs than in similar Swedish non-MNEs and Swedish 
MNEs pay more than 4 percent higher wages than Swedish non-MNEs. 
                                                           
1 See the early contributions by, e.g. Hymer (1960) and Dunning (1977). More recently, 
theories have been formalized and Markusen (2002) provide a thorough and synthesized 
survey of the modern models on MNEs. 
2 Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) set up a model predicting that only the most 
productive firms in an industry engage in FDI. They also provide evidence that MNEs 
have significant productivity advantages relative to non-MNEs. 
3 One could imagine MNEs to be particularly concerned by worker turnover when their 
firm-specific assets consist of proprietary technologies. Therefore, they may be willing 
to pay a wage premium to reduce the speed with which it leaks out to competitors as 
employees change jobs. 
4 Stiglitz (1987) surveys the theoretical literature on efficiency wages. 
5 See Figure 2 below where the firms have 20 employees or more.   2
Notably, the wage differential between foreign MNEs and Swedish MNEs 
is significant. 
Substantially increased foreign ownership is a striking feature in 
Swedish manufacturing in the 1990s. Partly, this situation has emerged as a 
result of foreign MNEs acquiring large Swedish MNEs. An obvious 
explanation to the higher wages in foreign owned firms might thus be that 
foreign MNEs have taken over Swedish MNEs that already pays higher 
wages. However, the higher wage level in foreign-owned firms could also 
proceed from a more general self-selection mechanism. Foreign-owned 
firms take over firms with good properties (cherry-picking). For instance, 
the targeted firms − Swedish MNEs or other Swedish firms − have 
employees with advantageous characteristics (often unobserved to an 
econometrician) and such firms pay relatively high wages.
6 By using a 
unique, detailed panel dataset on Swedish manufacturing firms in the 1990s 
I have the opportunity to examine these hypotheses. The results suggest 
that acquired Swedish firms pay higher wages before takeover, and this 
applies both to targeted Swedish MNEs and to targeted non-MNEs. 
Another, not mutually exclusive, explanation to the higher wage level in 
foreign-owned firms is when transfers of foreign MNEs’ firm-specific 
assets to acquired Swedish firms improve the post-acquisition performance 
of the targeted firms. Better ex-post performance might be manifested in, 
e.g. more favourable wage growth in acquired firms relative to firms that 
continue to be domestically owned. In contrast to self-selection (cherry-
picking) the direction of causality between foreign ownership and wages 
runs here the other way around. 
To investigate the hypothesis of improved post-acquisition performance 
I exploit my panel data on Swedish manufacturing firms in three different 
ways. First, by using a simple regression model, where I examine whether 
post-acquisition wage growth is higher in targeted firms. Second, by 
utilizing a firm-fixed effect model I can compare the wage level before and 
after the acquisition in firms that have turned into foreign ownership. Third, 
by employing a matching method. This latter method means that I pair 
together firms that have shifted to foreign ownership and firms with similar 
characteristics that continue to be domestically owned. After that I estimate 
                                                           
6 Consistent with this is the hypothesis that ownership transfers are associated with 
purchase and integration of good properties into new firms. Both McGuckin and 
Nguyen (1995), for US manufacturing, and Harris and Robinson (2002), for UK 
manufacturing, find that plants with high productivity were the most likely to 
experience ownership change. Yet the post-acquisition performance differs in the two 
studies. US plants that experienced ownership change improved their productivity, 
whereas in UK plants taken over by foreigners there is some evidence of decline in 
productivity.   3
if there is a difference in post-acquisition wage growth between the two 
types of firms. In none of the three approaches I am able to detect any 
significant differences in the development of wages after firms has been 
acquired by foreign MNEs. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents my panel data on 
Swedish manufacturing firms. Moreover, it shows some descriptive 
statistics on foreign-owned and domestically owned firms to see to what 
extent they differ. Also, it illustrates the increased importance of foreign 
ownership in Swedish manufacturing in the 1990s. In section 3, I estimate 
wage premiums in foreign MNEs and Swedish MNEs relative to non-
MNEs. In section 4.1, I examine whether foreign firms acquire high wage 
Swedish firms (cherry picking) and, in section 4.2, if wage growth is better 




2.  Data and description 
 
The dataset I employ in this study is supplied by Statistics Sweden and has 
been compiled into a microeconomic database at the Trade Union Institute 
for Economic Research (FIEF). The data comes from financial accounts of 
enterprises and register-based labor statistics. The dataset is a panel of 
firms that consists of all manufacturing firms with 20 employees and more 
for the period 1986 to 2000.
7 The constructed panel include 9833 unique 
firms and 870 firms are in the panel the whole fifteen-year period.
8 The 
firms’ share in total manufacturing employment is about 95 percent, which 
is a rough indicator on the coverage of the panel, and indicates that the 
investigated firms represent most of the employment in Swedish 
manufacturing. 
                                                           
7 Obviously, this is an advantage compared to the many studies using plant data, since 
most of the theoretical arguments to why foreign-owned firms differ refer to firm or 
company level (Pfaffermayr and Bellak, 2002). One problem with plant data is, for 
instance, is that non-production workers, such as R&D personnel, employees at head-
quarters and data-processing centers, might not be physically located at manufacturing 
establishments, but at auxiliary establishments (Doms and Jensen, 1998). 
8 More information on the panel can be found in Table A1 in Appendix.   4
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A foreign-owned firm is defined as a firm where foreign investors possess 
more than 50 percent of the voting rights. Foreign ownership has risen 
significantly in Swedish manufacturing between 1986 and 2000. Figure 1 
shows that the employment share in foreign-owned firm has increased by 
almost 25 percentage points over the period. Yet it was not until 1994 the 
employment in foreign-owned firms took off indeed. Since Sweden became 
member of the European Union (EU), in 1995, the employment share in 
foreign-owned firms has increased by about 15 percentage points. 
The development of the number of foreign firms and the frequencies of 
international ownership changes, in Table 1, reveal the same pattern. There 
is a steady increase in the number of foreign-owned firms and the number 
of ownership changes from domestic to foreign ownership is larger in the 
period after 1994 than in the period before 1994. Between 1986 and 1994, 
on average, 35 firms changed from domestic to foreign ownership, whereas 
the corresponding figure for the period 1994 to 2000 is 63 firms. After 
1994 ownership changes from foreign to domestic ownership grew as well, 
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Table  1. Number of foreign firms and frequency of inter-
national ownership changes. 
 
Number of firms  International ownership changes 
 Total   












(percent)**  Number Percent*
1986  341 (8.6)  3972            
1987  376 (9.5)  3962  1986/1987 22  (91.7)  2  (8.3) 24  0.6 
1988  431 (10.6)  4085  1987/1988 58  (93.5) 4  (6.5) 62  1.5 
1989  445 (10.8)  4134  1988/1989 20  (74.1) 7  (25.9) 27  0.7 
1990  445 (11.0)  4056  1989/1990 41  (62.1) 25  (37.9) 66  1.6 
1991  487 (12.1)  4021  1990/1991 53  (81.5) 12  (18.5) 65  1.6 
1992  483 (13.5)  3578  1991/1992 24  (92.3) 2  (7.7) 26  0.7 
1993  413 (12.5)  3295  1992/1993 26  (34.2) 50  (65.8) 76  2.3 
1994  436 (13.1)  3331  1993/1994 51  (73.9) 18  (26.1) 69  2.1 
1995  485 (13.6)  3555  1994/1995 67  (90.5) 7  (9.5) 74  2.1 
1996  530 (13.8)  3845  1995/1996 98  (66.7) 49  (33.3) 147  3.8 
1997  561 (14.4)  3892  1996/1997 51  (68.9) 23  (31.1) 74  1.9 
1998  601 (14.8)  4058  1997/1998 50  (67.6) 24  (32.4) 74  1.8 
1999  636 (15.8)  4013  1998/1999 64  (69.6) 28  (30.4) 92  2.3 
2000  636 (16.2)  3923  1999/2000 60  (71.4) 24  (28.6) 84  2.1 
Average 1986-1994  35 (75.6) 15 (24.4)  50  1.3 
Average 1994-2000  63 (72.7) 25 (27.3)  88  2.3 
   




yet the share of all international ownership changes is still around 25 
percent. The most likely reasons to the increased foreign ownership are that 
regulations that prevented foreigners from acquiring Swedish firms were 
abolished and the general trend in developed countries towards an 
increasing amount of international mergers and acquisitions.
9 In Table 1 we 
observe that between 1986 and 1994, on average, 1.3 percent of the firms 
in the panel changed ownership internationally, whereas that figure had 
increased to 2.3 percent in the period 1994 to 2000. 
 
                                                           
9 Other factors put forward are: (i) the Swedish tax system favour foreign ownership at 
expense of private Swedish ownership (Jonung 2002), (ii) Swedish firms were 
particularly cheap to acquire owing to the depreciation of the Swedish Krona in the 
beginning of the 1990s, (iii) the Swedish “business climate” had improved significantly 
in the 1990s compared with the situation in the 1980s, and (iv) it has been more inviting 
to acquire Swedish firms after the membership in the European Union (Malmberg and 
Sölvell 1998).   6
According to the theory on MNEs foreign firms are at an inherent 
disadvantage in the domestic market and must then have a specific 
advantage that enable them to invest abroad. Therefore, foreign firms might 
differ from domestically owned firms and a simple way to investigate that 
is to compare various characteristics of foreign-owned and domestically 
owned firms. Table 2 shows the differences between foreign-owned and 
domestically owned firms in 1986 and 2000. 
In Table 2 we can see that foreign-owned firms pay significantly higher 
wages.
10 However, we also notice that the skill intensities (the shares of  
 
 
Table  2.  Characteristics of foreign-owned and domestically 
owned firms, 1986 and 2000. 
 
1986 2000   
Variables  Foreign Domestic Difference 
(t-ratio) 
Foreign Domestic Difference 
(t-ratio) 
Average wage (financial)  219  202  17/(8.34)  316  280  36/(9.55) 
Average wage (rams)  136  126  10/(6.55)  199  178  21/(10.87) 
Wages: skilled (rams)  203  182  21/(5.55)  261  221  40/(11.91) 
Wages: less-skilled 
(rams) 
130 122 8/(5.16)  183 170  13/(10.00) 
Share of female workers  31.1  33.0  -1.9/(-0.12) 25.9  24.7  1.2/(1.60) 
Medium-skill intensity  8.4  6.2  1.2/(4.59)  19.5  14.0  5.5/(9.25) 
High-skill intensity  3.6  2.5  1.1/(1.84)  8.2  5.1  3.1/(7.80) 
Capital-labor ratio  105  85  20/(3.19)  349  255  94/(5.07) 
Employment 242  183  59/(1.13)  305  121  184/(7.63) 
Shipment 251  142  109/(2.36)  614  228  386/(2.93) 
Shipment/employee 745 407  338/(9.28)  1236 552  684/(14.16)
Value added/employee  277  254  23/(3.11)  455  378  77/(6.38) 
Number of firms  341  3631    636  3287   
 
Notes: Wages, shipment and value added are in 1990 prices. Wages are from two 
different sources: the firms’ financial accounts, average wage (financial), and the tax 
register, average wage (rams). More precisely, average wage (financial) is labor costs, 
including social security costs, per employee and average wage (rams) is annual 
earnings per employee. Wages, capital-labor ratios, value added and shipment per 
employee are in thousands SEK and shipment in millions SEK. Skill intensities are in 
percentages. The t-statistics tests the null hypothesis of equality between foreign-owned 
firms and domestically owned firms. 
 
                                                           
10 As in most other similar studies wages are calculated as compensation/number of 
workers, which means that I do not take hours of work into account. This is a possible 
source of mismeasurement, even though it may be a more severe problem outside 
manufacturing (Lipsey 2002).   7
medium-skilled and high-skilled labor)
11 and the capital-labor ratio are 
higher in foreign-owned firms. Moreover, the size of foreign-owned firms 
is larger; employment and shipment are significantly higher. However there 
is no significant difference in the share of female workers. Differences in 
skill and capital intensities may explain the difference in wages between 
foreign-owned and domestically owned firms. Furthermore, it is an 
established fact that larger firms tend to pay higher wages,
12 which might 
be another source to the wage differential between foreign-owned and 
domestically owned firms. This means that to determine whether foreign-
owned firms pay higher wages we have to rely on regression analysis, 
where we control for variations among the firms in skill intensities, capital-
labor ratios and size. Lastly, we observe that foreign-owned firms have 










To analyse whether there is a differential in wages between foreign-owned 
and domestically owned firms I estimate the following model 
 
  jt t jt jt jt jit Year Industry Firm FO w ε γ γ λ β α + + + + + = 2 1 ln  (1) 
 
jit w  is average wage in firm j, in industry i at time t. In some 
specifications I divided average wage into skilled labor wage 
s w and less-
skilled labor wage 
u w .  jt FO  is a dummy variable for foreign ownership; 
                                                           
11 Employees with some post-secondary education are defined as skilled labor. Most 
likely, such a division into skilled and less-skilled labor is more appropriate than the 
often used, e.g. in Doms and Jensen (1998), non-production/production worker 
classification. In addition, I divide skilled labor into medium-skilled and high-skilled 
labor. Employees with post-secondary education three years and more are high-skilled 
labor and employees with post-secondary education less than three years are medium-
skilled labor. 
12 Oi and Idson (1999) survey that literature. 
13 The labor productivity differential between foreign-owned and domestically owned 
firms in Swedish manufacturing is still significant when variations in factor intensities 
and size are taken into account (Karpaty 2004).   8
1 = jt FO  implies that firm j is foreign-owned at time t.  jt Firm  is a vector of 
firm specific characteristics, such as capital-labor ratio  ( ) L K / ln , shares of 
medium-skilled (MS/L) and high-skilled labor (HS/L), share of female 
workers (Female/L) and size  ( ) employment ln .  jt Industry  are industry dummy 
variables,
14  t Year  are time dummies, and  jt ε  is an error term. 
 



















       
Foreign  ownership  0.094 0.076 0.041 0.101 0.043 






       
Capital-labor ratio      0.022  0.027  0.020 




       
Share of female workers      -0.009  -0.019  -0.002 
Female/L     [-3.10]
*** [-4.62]
*** [-1.22] 
       
Medium-skill intensity      0.661     
MS/L     [25.00]
***    
       
High-skill intensity      0.853  0.518   
HS/L     [32.04]
***  [4.65]
***   
       
Size     0.015  0.062  0.016 




       
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
2 R   0.273 0.407 0.559 0.149 0.427 
Observations  50,325 50,325 50,325 50,325 50,325 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in this table and in the tables below is average wage 
(rams). Replacing that with average wage (financial) does not affect the interpretation of 
the results. The number of industries is 20 (see Table A2 in Appendix). Square brackets 
give White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. ***, **, * indicate significance at 
1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
                                                           
14 For the whole period 1986-2000 I use a consistent classification into 20 industries 
(Table A2 in Appendix), whereas for the period 1993-2000 I employ the SNI92 3-digit 
code (99 industries).   9
Foreign ownership wage premiums are shown in Table 3. According to 
column (1) foreign-owned firms pay, on average between 1986 and 2000, 
more than 9 percent higher wages than domestically owned firms. Partly, 
this wage differential is explained by a concentration of foreign-owned 
firms to industries that pay high wages. Controlling for industry effects, in 
column (2), reduces the wage differential to 7.6 percent. The significant 
differential between foreign–owned and domestically owned firms is 
sustained even when firm characteristics, such as capital-labor ratios, skill 
intensities, the share of female workers and size, are taken into account. 
Yet we notice, in column (3), that the differential has fallen to 4.1 percent, 
which signify that such controls play an important role. Moreover, we 
remark that the coefficients on all control variables have the expected sign 
and are highly significant. Finally, as is evident from columns (4) and (5), 
the wage differential between workers in foreign-owned firms and 
domestically owned firms appears to be more pronounced for skilled labor; 
10.1 percent for skilled labor, whereas it is 4.3 percent for less-skilled 
labor. Hence, skilled labor seems to benefit more from working in foreign-
owned firms. 
It is well known that Swedish MNEs has been, and still are, dominating 
employers in Swedish manufacturing (see Figure 2 below). As MNEs they 
also should possess firm-specific assets that makes them more productive 
and profitable than non-MNEs. This means, in turn, that they, like foreign 
owned firms, would be able to pay higher wages. Consequently, significant 
differences should exist between MNEs and non-MNEs, rather than 
between domestically owned and foreign-owned firms (Doms and Jensen 
1998). 
To distinguish the relative importance in Swedish manufacturing of 
MNEs and non-MNEs and of foreign-owned and domestically owned 
firms, I divide the firms in our dataset into three groups: Swedish MNEs, 
foreign-owned firms, and non-MNEs. Between 1993 and 2000 I am 
capable to discern Swedish MNEs and other domestically owned firms. A 
Swedish MNE is a domestically owned firm that has at least one affiliate 
abroad or is part of an enterprise group that has affiliates abroad.15 Non-
MNEs are firms that neither are Swedish MNEs nor are foreign-owned 
firms. Figure 2 illustrates how the share of employment has developed for 
the various types of firms between 1993 and 2000. 
                                                           
15 Contrary to Doms and Jensen (1998) my data also include smaller Swedish MNEs. 
Among U.S. firms that have more 500 employees they distinguish between plants in 
U.S. MNEs and plants in other U.S. firms; U.S. MNEs are defined as U.S. firms with 
foreign assets comprising more than 10 percent of total assets.   10
Figure 2.  Employment share of foreign-owned firms and of 


















1993  1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000 




In the figure I have excluded the non-MNEs since the employment share of 
that group has been almost constant, around 26 percent over the period. 
This implies that a considerable share of the employees in Swedish 
manufacturing is working in MNEs. From the figure we observe that the 
employment shares in Swedish MNEs and in foreign MNEs mirror each 
other; the share in foreign MNEs has increased at the expense of the share 
in Swedish MNEs. The employment share in Swedish MNEs has fallen 
from 55 percent in 1993 to 43 percent in 2000, whereas the employment 
share in foreign-owned firms, during the same period, has risen from 18 
percent to 33 percent. One important explanation is that over the period 
several large Swedish MNEs has become foreign-owned due to mergers 
with and acquisitions by foreign MNEs, e.g. Pharmacia and Upjohn 1995 
and Ford and Volvo Car Corporation 1999. In Table 4, we see that not 
quite 30 percent of the changes in ownership from domestic to foreign is 
Swedish MNEs turning into foreign MNEs. Also, worth noting is that these 
firms are significantly larger than other Swedish firms that become foreign-
owned, on average, 630 employees compared with 215 employees in other 
Swedish firms.  
   11
Table 4. Frequency of ownership changes from Swedish MNEs 




  Ownership changes from 
Swedish MNEs to foreign MNEs 
   Number    Percent* 
1993/1994 3  5.9 
1994/1995 12  17.9 
1995/1996 49  50.0 
1996/1997 10  19.6 
1997/1998 12  24.0 
1998/1999 27  42.2 
1999/2000 9  15.0 
1993-2000 17  27.0 
 
Notes: * share of all changes from domestic to foreign ownership (see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 5. Characteristics of MNEs (foreign and Swedish) and  
non-MNEs in Swedish manufacturing 2000. 
 



















Average wage (financial)  316  313  3/(0.59)  269  44/(12.89) 
Average wage (rams)  199  197  2/(0.75)  172  24/(14.72) 
Wages: skilled (rams)  261  253  8/(1.80)  209  44/(14.30) 
Wages: less-skilled 
(rams) 
183 180  3/(2.05)  166  14/(10.99) 
Share of female workers  25.9  26.4  -0.5/(-0.54)  24.0  2.4/(3.22) 
Skill intensity  195  18.5  1.0/(1.28)  12.4  6.1/(11.48) 
High skill intensity  8.2  7.9  0.3/(0.55)  4.1  3.8/(10.79) 
Capital-labor ratio  349  327  22/(0.70)  229  98/(5.82) 
Employment 305  298  7/(0.16)  58  240/(13.55) 
Shipment 616  719  -103/(-0.40)  54  665/(5.57) 
Shipment/employee 1238  1062  176/(2.50) 374 688/(16.83) 
Value added/employee  455  410  45/(2.34)  367  43/(4.10) 
Number of firms  650  849    2424   
 
Notes: Foreign MNEs are firms where foreign investors possess more than 50 percent 
of the voting rights. Swedish MNEs are domestically owned firms that have at least one 
affiliate abroad or are part of an enterprise group that have affiliates abroad. The 
remaining Swedish firms are classified as non-MNEs. The notes in Table 1 contain 
variable definitions. The t-statistics test the null hypotheses of equality between foreign 
MNE and Swedish MNEs, as well as equality between Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs.   12
The summary statistics in Table 5 indicates, as we expected, that the 
important differences in characteristics appear to exist between MNEs and 
non-MNEs. Swedish MNEs pay higher wages, have higher share of female 
workers, are more skill intensive, have higher capital- labor ratios, are 
larger, and have higher productivity than non-MNEs. All these differences 
are significant, whereas, on the other hand, there are no significant 
differences (except in productivity and wages for less-skilled) between 
foreign MNEs and Swedish MNEs. 
To determine if the wages differ between the various types of firms I 
estimate the same regression model as in equation (1) for the period 1993 
to 2000, except that I add another dummy variable  jt SMNE .  1 = jt SMNE  if 
firm j is a Swedish MNE at time t. 
 
jt t jt jt jt jt jit Year Industry Firm SMNE FO w ε γ γ λ β β α + + + + + + = 2 1 2 1 ln  (2) 
 
1 β  and  2 β  tells us whether foreign-owned firms and Swedish MNEs pay 
higher wages than non-MNEs. By testing the hypothesis  2 1 β β =  we can see 
if the wage level in foreign-owned firms and Swedish MNEs differ. Table 6 
presents the estimates. 
From column (1) we infer that foreign-owned firms pay 4.7 percent 
higher wages than domestically owned firms. Comparing the estimates in 
column (1) with my result in Table 3 column (3) indicates that using a 
more detailed industry classification and shortening of the time period do 
not affect the result to any larger extent (if so the wage differential is larger 
in Table 6). When I divide the domestically owned firms into Swedish 
MNEs and non-MNEs we observe that the wage differential is larger 
between foreign-owned firms and non-MNEs. According to column (2) the 
wages are 6.6 percent higher in foreign MNEs, whereas Swedish MNEs 
only pay 4.1 percent more than non-MNEs. Moreover, I find the wage 
differential of 2.5 percent between foreign MNEs and Swedish MNEs to be 
significant. Like in Table 3, it appears to be skilled labor that benefits most 
from working in MNEs, particularly in foreign-owned firms. Column (3) 
hints that the wage differential for skilled labor in foreign-owned firms and 
in non-MNEs is as large as 13.8 percent, while for less-skilled labor it is 
just 7 percent. A similar, yet less marked, pattern occurs between Swedish 
MNEs and non-MNEs.
16 
                                                           
16 Doms and Jensen (1998) obtain similar result for US manufacturing plants in 1987. 
Also in their study (Table 7.5), the large differences exist between plants of MNEs 
(foreign-owned and US-owned) and plants of other US firms. However, in contrast to   13
Table 6.  MNE (foreign and Swedish) wage premium in  












Foreign ownership  0.047  0.066  0.138  0.070 





        
Swedish MNE    0.041  0.095  0.045 




        
Capital-labor ratio  0.016  0.015  0.020  0.013 





        






        
Medium-skill intensity  0.368  0.348     
MS/L  [19.18]
*** [18.20]
***    
        





        
Size 0.019  0.012  0.042  0.013 





        
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 











2 R   0.611 0.617 0.230  0.490 
Observations 27,411  27,411  27,411 27,411 
Notes: In contrast to Table 3 here I am able to control for 99 industries on SNI92 3-digit 





                                                                                                                                                                          
my result in Table 6 it is plants of US MNEs that pay the highest wages and the 
production (“less-skilled”) workers that gain most from working in MNEs.   14
4.  Selection or favourable wage growth? 
 
Section 3 has documented that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages than 
domestically owned firms. However, I also found that Swedish MNEs have 
higher wage level than other domestically owned firms. These results are 
consistent with the conjecture that the ability to pay high wages is linked to 
whether a firm is MNE or not, rather than related to if a firm is foreign-
owned or not. The positive relationship between wages and foreign 
ownership might then be explained by the fact that many Swedish MNEs, 
through international mergers and acquisitions, have turn into foreign 
MNEs; firms already paying high wages have become foreign-owned. 
Nevertheless, the causality may as well run the other way around; firms 
that become foreign-owned have better wage growth than firms that 
continue to be domestically owned. Moreover, worthy of notice is that 
these two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. 
 
 
4.1 Do foreigners acquire high-wage firms? 
To answer the question whether foreign firms pay higher wages simply 
because they acquire high-wage domestically owned firms I run the 
following regression model 
 
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 ln − − − − − + + + + + = jt t jt jt jt jit Year Industry Firm FO w ε γ γ λ β α  (3) 
 
Here, I select firms that are domestically owned in year t-1 and regress 
ownership status in year t along with firm-specific characteristics in t-1 on 
their wage level in year t-1. We can interpret the β  coefficient as the wage 
premium in future acquired firms one year before the acquisition took 
place. A positive sign on β  indicates that firms taken over by a foreign 
firm one year before the acquisition had relatively high wage level 
compared to those firms not been acquired by foreign firms.
17 The results 






                                                           
17 I emphasize there is no causal effects; the regression equation in (3) is purely 
descriptive.   15
Table 7.  Foreign ownership and selection of high-wage firms,  
1993-2000. 
 









        
Foreign ownership  0.031  0.041  0.044  0.034 





        
Swedish MNE    0.034     
() 1 − jt SMNE    [15.50]
***    
        
() 1 − × jt jt SMNE FO    -0.012    
   [-1.00]
    
        
Capital-labor ratio  0.017  0.016  0.021  0.015 





        
Share of female workers  -0.412  -0.419  -0.224  -0.444 





        
Medium-skill intensity  0.348  0.328     
() 1 / − jt L S   [15.38]
*** [14.49]
***    
        
High-skill intensity  1.159  1.127  1.400   




        
Size 0.021  0.015  0.064  0.023 





        
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        
2 R   0.603 0.608 0.197 0.499 
Observations 17,799  17,799  17,799  17,799 
 
Notes: I employ dummies for 99 industries on SNI92 3-digit level. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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The  β  coefficient in column (1) indicates that the wage level in targeted 
firms is significantly higher (3.1 percent) one year before the foreign 
takeover occurs than in firms that continue to be domestically owned.
18 
This indicates that almost 66 percent of the wage differential between 
foreign owned firms and domestically owned firms already exist before the 
foreign takeover between targeted firms and firms that continue to be 
Swedish owned.
19 
From Table 6 we know that Swedish MNEs pay higher wages than non-
MNEs and Figure 2 shows that during the studied period several Swedish 
MNEs have turned into foreign MNEs. The result in column (1) might then 
be driven by high-wage Swedish MNEs becoming foreign owned. To 
examine to what extent this actually is the case I add, in column (2), a 
dummy variable () 1 − jt SMNE  which point out whether firm j is a Swedish 
MNE in  1 − t ,  ( ) 1 1 = − jt SMNE , or not. Moreover, I append an interaction 
variable  () jt jt FO SMNE × −1 . This means that I am capable to obtain estimates 
on wage levels in Swedish MNE, as well as non-MNEs, before foreign take- 
 
Table 8. Wages in targeted firms (and indigenous Swedish  
MNEs) relative to indigenous non-MNEs the year before foreign  
takeover. 
 






      
All targeted firms  3.1 %  4.4 %  3.4 % 
  [5.92] [3.23]  [5.72] 
      
Targeted Swedish MNEs  2.9 %  3.1 %  3.0 % 
  [3.01] [1.62]  [2.83] 
      
Targeted Non-MNEs  4.1 %  7.2 %  4.5 % 
  [6.83] [4.08]  [6.53] 









      
 
Notes: Square brackets give White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. 
 
                                                           
18  Using the longer time period 1986-2000 gives similar result. The wage levels in 
targeted firms are significantly higher (3.0 %). 
19 The 3.1 percent ex-ante wage differential is related to the estimate on FO in Table 6 
column (1), where the wage differential is 4.7 percent.   17
overs relative to the wage level in non-MNEs that continue to be 
domestically owned. Not surprisingly, the ex-ante wage level in Swedish 
MNEs is higher (4.1 % - 1.2 % = 2.9 %) and significant (t-value = 3.01). 
However, the wage level the year before foreign takeover is significantly 
higher in targeted non-MNEs as well (4.1 %). Hence and most interesting, 
the higher ex-ante wage level we observe in column (1) appears not only to 
be explained by high-wage Swedish MNEs becoming foreign-owned, even 
targeted non-MNEs pay high wages. Likewise in column (1), we notice, in 
columns (3) and (4), that ex-ante skilled, as well as ex-ante less-skilled, 
wages are significantly higher in firms acquired by foreign firms. Table 8 
summarizes the wage differentials between targeted firms and indigenous 
non-MNEs the year before foreign takeover. 
 
4.2 Do firms acquired by foreigners have better wage 
growth? 
 
There are several ways to examine whether domestically owned firms 
taken over by foreign firms enjoy higher wage growth than firms that 
continue to be domestically owned. I will use three different approaches to 
investigate that. First, I compare the rate of growth in wages between these 
types of firms in a simple regression model. Second, I utilize a panel model 
with fixed firm effects. Third, I employ a matching approach. 
 
A simple regression model 
A straightforward method to evaluate the effect of foreign ownership on the 
development of wages is to regress the rate of growth in wages over a time 
period (here four years) on ownership status in the beginning of the period 
and control for changes in factor intensities and for initial firm 
characteristics. 
 
  ( ) + ∆ + + = − = ∆ − + jT jt jit jit jiT Firm FO w w w 1 1 3 4 / ln ln ln λ β α  
  jT T jt jt Year Industry Firm ε γ γ λ + + + − − 2 1 1 1 2    (4) 
 
jiT w ln ∆  is the annual average rate of wage growth in firm j in industry i 
over the four-year time period T, i.e. between  1 − t  and  3 + t . In the analysis 
I select all firms that are domestically owned in  1 − t  and  jt FO  equals 1 if 
firm j is foreign owned at time t. As firm controls  jT Firm ∆  I add changes in 
female worker share, capital-labor ratio and skill intensity in firm j during   18
the period T;  1 − jt Firm  is the initial size (employment) of firm j. Dummies for 
industries in  1 − t ,  1 − t Industry , and period dummies,  T Year , are included. 
Table 9 presents the results. 
We observe no difference in annual wage growth between firms that 
become foreign owned and firms that continue to be domestically owned.
20 
As we would expect, annual wage growth is higher in firms where capital- 
 










Foreign ownership  0.0003 
jt FO   [0.237] 
  
Change in capital-labor ratio  0.011 
() jT L K / ln ∆   [7.19]
*** 
  
Change in female worker share  -0.006 
() jT L Female/ ∆   [-0.54] 
  
Change in medium-skill share  0.405 
() jT L MS / ∆   [10.68]
*** 
  
Change in high-skill share  0.517 




  -0.016 
1 ) ln( − jt employment   [-3.37]
*** 
  
Year dummies  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes 
  
2 R   0.224 
Observations 19,110 
 
Notes: I use dummies for 20 industries (see Table A3 in Appendix). 
 
                                                           
20 I have experimented with using the shorter time period 1993-2000 and then taking 
into account that domestic firms are either Swedish MNEs or non-MNEs. However, 
there is still no difference in wage growth between targeted firms and indigenous firms.   19
labor ratios and skill intensities are growing faster. Moreover, larger firms 
seem to have slower wage growth, whereas changes in the share of female 
workers are unrelated to wage growth. 
 
 
Panel model with firm fixed effects 
Another possible way to investigate if wage growth is higher in firms 
acquired by foreign firms is to use a long panel dataset and estimate a 
model with firm fixed effects. In such a model any permanent 
characteristics of individual firms are absorbed by the fixed effects and do 
not appear as the consequence of foreign ownership. I estimate the 
following model 
 
  jt j t jt jt jit f Year Firm FO w ε γ λ β α + + + + + = ln    (5) 
 
where  j f  is a time-invariant firm-specific fix effect. The β  coefficient 
tells us if wages in firms that switch to foreign ownership are higher after 
they have changed to foreign ownership. The usual vector of firm 
characteristics,  jt Firm , are added and year dummies,  t Year , control for 
cyclical factors. Table 10 reports the outcome from estimating the firm 
fixed effect model. 
In column (1), I estimate the model for the period 1986-2000 and I find 
no effect on wages of foreign ownership.
21 In column (2), I apply the same 
specification, but for a shorter period, 1993-2000. However, for that period 
I also have the opportunity to examine whether firms that become Swedish 
MNEs  − establish affiliates abroad − pay higher wages after they go 
abroad. Still, there is no evidence of different wages after domestically 
owned firms have been taken over by foreigners. Nor is it any wage 
premium in firms turning into Swedish MNEs. In columns (3) and (4), I 
estimate the model separately for skilled and less-skilled labor. For skilled 
labor, there exist in fact a significant ex-post wage effect when firms 
change into Swedish MNE; no such effect prevail, however, when firms 
 
                                                           
21 Also, I find no effect on skilled and less-skilled wages of foreign ownership (not 
shown here). The results stand out in opposition to the findings in Conyon et al. (2002) 
and Lipsey and Sjöholm (2002). Both studies use firm(plant)-fixed effect models. In 
Conyon et al. there is a significant wage premium of 3.4 percent for workers in firms 
acquired by foreigners in the UK, 1989-1994. Lipsey and Sjöholm find significant wage 
premiums in Indonesian plants taken over by foreigners 1975-1999; for white-collar 
workers 21 percent and for blue-collar workers 10 percent.   20

















        
Foreign ownership  -0.003  0.003  0.010  0.002 





        
Swedish MNE    0.003  0.015  0.003 




        
Capital-labor ratio  0.009  0.009  0.011  0.008 





        






        
Medium-skill intensity  0.443  0.256     
L MS /   [41.71]
***  [15.13]
***    
        
High-skill intensity  0.577  0.741  0.552   




        
Size -0.024  -0.017  0.014  -0.014 





        
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        










Bhargava-DW 1.12 1.34 1.27  1.36 




















Observations 50,325  27,413  27,413  27,413 
 
 
become foreign-owned. For less-skilled labor, on the other hand, there is no 
impact, neither on the wage level in firms that changes into Swedish MNE, 
nor on wages in firms that changes into foreign ownership. In sum, the fix 
effect estimates in Table 10 indicate that changes into foreign ownership do 
not have any effect on wage levels. Yet becoming a Swedish MNE may 
affect wages of skilled labor positively. 
 
   21
A matching approach 
A quite popular method recently to investigate ex-post performance of, e.g. 
foreign ownership and exporting, is matching.
22 Although, one may have 
doubts about the appropriateness of utilizing the matching method on firms 
I, nevertheless, make use of it as a complement to the other approaches. 
The matching approach means that for every domestically owned firm 
that become foreign owned (treated units) I attempt to find another firm, 
which has similar characteristics in the year before that event, but continue 
to be domestically owned (control units).
23 By using the nearest-neighbor 
matching method I pair together firms switching to foreign ownership and 
firms that always are domestically owned with the same or similar so-
called propensity scores. I obtain the propensity scores from a probit 
regression of a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is foreign owned 
or not at time t,  jt FO , on relevant firm characteristics in  1 − t . More 
specifically, I estimate the regression equation 
 
  jt t jt jt jt jt Year Industry Firm w FO ε γ γ λ β α + + + + + = − − − − 1 2 1 1 1 1 ln  (6) 
 
1 ln − jt w  is log average wage in firm j at time  1 − t .  1 − jt Firm  is capital-labor 
ratio,  () L K / ln , shares of medium-skilled (MS/L) and high-skilled labor 
(HS/L), share of female workers (Female/L) and size  ( ) employment ln  in firm 
j at time  1 − t . Table 11 presents the estimates. 
Interestingly, we observe that wages are significantly higher in firms that 
become foreign owned, which is consistent with my result in Tables 7 and 
8. Also, we notice that larger firms are more inclined to be foreign owned. 
Somewhat surprising it seems that the share of medium-skilled labor is 
significantly lower in target firms.
24 
 
                                                           
22 See e.g. Girma et al. (2002) and Girma and Görg (2003). The method is frequently 
used in the evaluation literature on active labor market programs. Heckman et al. (1999) 
give a comprehensive overview of the labor economics literature. Becker and Ichino 
(2002) is a useful guide to handle matching with Stata. 
23 See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
24 Using the shorter time period and a more detailed industry classification gives similar 
result.   22







Log average wage  0.720 
1 ln − jt w   (5.71)
*** 
  
Capital-labor ratio  0.016 
() 1 / ln − jt L K   (0.90) 
  
Female worker share  0.018 
() 1 / − jt L Female   (1.13) 
  
Medium-skill share  -0.635 
() 1 / − jt L MS   (-2.33)
** 
  
High-skill share  -0.503 
() 1 / − jt L HS   (-1.64) 
  
Size
  0.167 
1 ) ln( − jt employment   (11.46)
*** 
  
Year dummies  Yes 
Industry dummies  Yes 
  
Pseudo 
2 R   0.085 
Observations 33,936 
 
Notes: I use dummies for 20 industries (see Table A3 in Appendix). z-statistics is in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Once each firm that switch to foreign ownership is matched with a firm that 
continue to be domestically owned, the difference in annual average wage 
growth between the treated units and the control units is computed.
25 By 
averaging these differences I get the Average effect of Treatment on the 
Treated (ATT). Ex-post annual average wage growth is about 0.4 percent 
higher in the firms that become foreign owned. Yet the difference is far 
from significant (t-value = 0.32). In other words, the outcome of the 
matching approach confirms the previous results I obtained from using the 
simple regression model in Table 9 and the firm-fixed effect model in 
Table 10, namely, that firms acquired by foreigners do not have higher 
wage growth than firms that continue to be domestically owned. 
                                                           
25 461 treated units are matched to 450 control units.   23
5.  Summary and conclusions 
 
Like in most other studies for various countries
26 foreign-owned Swedish 
manufacturing firms pay higher wages than other domestically owned 
firms, also when I control for appropriate firm characteristics.
27 However, 
consistent with theories on MNEs and in conformity with Doms and Jensen 
(1998) for the US, the important differences appear to exist between MNEs 
(Swedish MNEs and foreign-owned firms) and non-MNEs, rather than 
between foreign-owned and domestically owned firms. Interestingly, my 
estimates indicate that there are even higher wages in foreign MNEs than in 
Swedish MNEs. Moreover, my results suggest that skilled labor benefit 
most from working in MNEs. The higher wages in MNEs might reflect that 
workers share some of the rents the MNEs’ firm-specific assets may 
generate or that working in an MNE require higher level of effort or greater 
skills (unexplained by the level of education).
28 
Foreigners selecting high-wage Swedish firms for acquisition could 
explain the higher wages in foreign owned firms. Since many 
manufacturing Swedish MNEs have been the target in foreign takeovers in 
the 1990s this is a well-founded supposition. My analysis confirms that 
wages are significantly higher in Swedish firms selected for acquisition. 
This applies to targeted Swedish MNEs and, yet surprisingly, also to 
targeted Swedish non-MNEs. 
I use three different approaches to investigate the development of wages 
in Swedish manufacturing firms taken over by foreigners. The result shows 
that the ex-post wage growth has not been better in targeted firms than in 
firms that continued to be Swedish owned. Hence, the higher wages in 
foreign-owned firms in Swedish manufacturing seems to be a result of 
selection and not caused by foreign ownership per se.
29 
 
                                                           
26 For developed countries, e.g. Feliciano and Lipsey (1999), the US, and Girma et al. 
(2001), the UK, and for developing countries, e.g. Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey (1996), 
Mexico and Venezuela, and Lipsey and Sjöholm (2001), Indonesia. 
27 By using matched employer-employee data Heyman et al. (2004) estimate a lower 
wage premium in foreign-owned firms in Sweden than I obtain. However, their results 
are not fully comparable with mine since their analysis includes both manufacturing and 
services and is carried out for a shorter period of time (1996-2000). 
28 Head (1998) 
29 This contrasts sharply to the findings in Lipsey and Sjöholm (2002) for Indonesia.   24
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Table A1. Panel information. 
 
Years in  No of    Year  No of 
the panel  firms      firms 
15 870    1986  3972 
14 340    1987  3962 
13 276    1988  4085 
12 248    1989  4134 
11 268    1990  4056 
10 270    1991  4021 
9 302    1992  3578 
8 362    1993  3295 
7 519    1994  3331 
6 651    1995  3555 
5 720    1996  3845 
4 869    1997  3892 
3 1015    1998  4058 
2 1301    1999  4013 
1 1822    2000  3923 
Total number   
of firms: 9833   
Total number of 
firm-years: 57720 
 
Notes: The dataset includes all manufacturing firms with 
20 employees or more 
 
 
   27
Table A2. The 20 manufacturing industries: Linking SNI69 with  
SNI92. 
 
No SNI92  SNI69  Industry 
1  15+16  31  Food, beverages and tobacco 
2  17+18+19  32  Textiles, apparel and leather 
3 20  331  Wood  products 
4  21  341  Paper and paper products 
5  22  342  Printing and publishing 
6 23+24-244  (351/354)-3522  Chemicals 
7  244  3522  Drugs and medicines 
8  25  355+356  Rubber and plastics 
9  26  36  Non-metallic mineral products 
10 27  371+372  Basic  metals 
11 28  381  Metal  products 
12 29+30  382  Non-electrical  machinery 
13 31  383-3832  Electrical  machinery 
14 32  3832  Telecommunication 
15 33  385  Professional  goods 
16 34  3843  Motor  vehicles 
17 351  3841  Shipbuilding 
18 353  3845  Aircraft 
19 352+354+355 3842+3844+3849  Other  transport equipment 
20 36  39+332  Other  manufacturing 
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